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INTRODUCTION

In the past several years, private lenders and lenders within
t Associate Dean and Professor of Law, The University of Montana School of
Law; B.B.A., University of Iowa, 1976; J.D., Northwestern University, 1979.
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the Farm Credit System successfully argued against claims by
farmers and ranchers who allege wrongful termination of
credit.' This trend has discounted the theories successfully developed and used by farmers and ranchers in the mid-eighties
to recover from lenders when credit was unexpectedly terminated. 2 Courts 3 and legislators4 appear to be narrowing many

of those theories. However, despite these new efforts to narrow lender liability suits, farmers are sure to continue asserting
lender liability claims.'
This Article examines the courts' growing tendency to reject
lender liability claims and the remaining viability of duty-based
tort claims against agricultural lenders. This Article first identifies the differences between agricultural loans and other types
1. Shaner v. United States, 976 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1992); Williams v. Federal
Land Bank, 954 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 299 (1992); Nelson v.
Production Credit Ass'n, 930 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 417
(1991); Ulrich v. Federal Land Bank, 480 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); State
Bank v. Curry, 476 N.W.2d 635 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Norwest Bank Montevideo v.
General Dryer Corp., No. C4-89-1986, 1990 WL 48553 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 17,
1990); Yoest v. Farm Credit Bank, 832 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992);
Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., 803 P.2d 614 (Mont. 1990); Production Credit Ass'n
v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990); Waddell v. Dewey County Bank, 471 N.W.2d.
591 (S.D. 1991); Garrett v. Bankwest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1990); Zwemer v.
Production Credit Ass'n, 792 P.2d 245 (Wyo. 1990). See also Steven Bahis & Jane
Easter Bahls, Whatever Happenedto Lender Liability, FARM FUTURES, 30H (January 1992).
But see Rural Am. Bank v. Herickhoff, 485 N.W.2d 702 (Minn. 1992).
2.

Steven C. Bahls, Termination of Credit for the Farm or Ranch: Theories of Lender

Liability, 48 MONT. L. REV. 213 (1987). For an excellent discussion of borrower litigation against the Farm Credit Systems, see Christopher R. Kelley & BarbaraJ. Hoekstra, A Guide to Borrower Litigation Against the Farm Credit System and the Rights of Farm

Credit Borrowers, 66 N.D. L.

REV.

127 (1990). For a discussion of effects of legislative

changes, see James T. Massey & Susan A. Schneider, Title I of the AgriculturalCredit Act
of 1987: "A Law in Search of Enforcement", 23 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 589 (1990).
3. See supra note 1.
4. John L. Culhane, Jr. & Dean C. Gramlich, Lender Liability Limitation Amendments
to State Statutes of Frauds, 45 Bus. LAw. 1779 (1990); Michael L. Weissman, State Legislation Limiting Lender Liability: The Need for Uniformity, 108 BANKING L.J. 136 (1991);
Todd C. Pearson, Note, Limiting Lender Liability: The Trend Toward Written Credit Agreement Statutes, 76 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1991); Sharon L. Rose, Comment, Recent Lender
Liability Decisions in Nebraska: A RationalApproach, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 631, 639-45

(1992).
5. According to a 1992 second quarter survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 5.3% of Ninth Federal Reserve District farmers have
gone out of business or partially liquidated within the last twelve months because of
financial distress. Stanley L. Graham, Rural Banks Enjoy Health Loan Portfolios, But
Farm Profits Fall and Land Prices Improve Only Slightly, FEDGAZETrE, Oct. 1992, at 7.

Many farmers negotiated loan workout agreements in response to the agricultural
credit crisis of the late 1980s. As those agreements mature (many had a five-year
term), agricultural bankruptcies and lender liability claims become more likely.
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of commercial loans and then analyzes the courts' treatment of
commonly asserted lender liability claims and legislative responses. Ultimately, the Article proposes that courts should
evaluate claims on a case by case basis. Where agricultural
lenders assume a duty to act as farm financial advisors, agricultural lenders must be accountable for the negligent discharge
of any duties they assume by virtue of their special
relationships.
II.

LENDER LIABILITY FOR AGRICULTURAL LOANS

The hurdles faced by farmers and ranchers in winning
lender liability suits are part of an apparent growing hostility
toward all lender liability claims. Several leading cases clearly
illustrate this judicial change in attitude.6
In 1985, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided KM. C.
Co. v. Irving Trust Co. 7 Writing for the court, Judge Cornelia

Kennedy developed a standard to scrutinize credit decisions by
loan officers. The standard required the loan officers' decisions to be measured against those of reasonable loan officers.8
Judge Kennedy stated that, in order for a lender to avoid liability, "there must be some objective basis upon which a reasonable loan officer in the exercise of his discretion would have
acted in that manner." 9 Evidence of bad faith, the court found,
included personality conflicts between a loan officer and the
borrower,' 0 a loan officer's conduct that violated bank policy,"
and the bank officer's knowledge that failure to give reasonable
notice of credit would destroy the borrower financially.' 2
Since the KM.C. Co. decision in 1985, courts have hesitated
to second guess the credit decisions of loan officers. Instead,
the courts have demonstrated an increased willingness to respect the sanctity of loan documents. Because loan documents
are almost always drafted by lenders, with the lender's protec6. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Kham & Nate's
Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990); Kruse v.
Bank of America, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043
(1989).
7. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 752 (6th Cir. 1985).

8. Id.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 761 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 761-62 (6th Cir. 1985).
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tion in mind, this new attitude creates formidable obstacles for
borrowers. Thejudicial attitude protecting the sanctity of loan
documents is perhaps best exemplified by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v.
First Bank of Whiting.' 3 Judge Frank Easterbrook, articulating
what lenders consider a compelling repudiation of KM.C.,
Inc.,'" wrote: "Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter, even to the great discomfort
of their trading partners, without being mulcted for lack of
'good faith.' "I' Easterbrook reasoned that lenders do not
have a "general duty of 'kindness' in performance" and courts
should not engage in "judicial oversight into whether a party
had 'good cause' to act as it did."' 6 A lender is neither an "eleemosynary institution" nor "bound to treat customers with
the same consideration reserved for their families."' 7 Lenders,
according to Judge Easterbrook, are "entitled to advance
[their] own interests" and need not put the borrowers' interest
first. 8 Judge Easterbrook declined to follow KM.C., Inc. '9 and
concluded that "[a]ny attempt to add an overlay of 'just cause'
...

to the exercise of contractual privileges would reduce com-

20
mercial certainty and breed costly litigation.
Another case emphasizing the sanctity of agricultural loan
contracts is Kruse v. Bank of America.2 1 In Kruse, a jury awarded
$20 million in compensatory damages and $26.7 million in punitive damages against the lender and in favor of California
apple farmers. 2 The California Court of Appeals reversed.23
The farmers contended that the lender induced them to bor-

13. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
14. 757 F.2d at 752.
15. Kahm, 908 F.2d at 1357.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1357-58.
18. Id. at 1358.
19. Id. Several other courts have also criticized K.M.C., Inc. or declined to follow
it. See, e.g., National Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 680 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991); Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Dist. Sys., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1341 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Check Reporting Serv. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-Lansing, 478
N.W.2d 893, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Pavco Indus. v. First Nat'l Bank, 534 So. 2d
572, 577 (Ala. 1988).
20. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351,
1357 (7th Cir. 1990).
21. 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043 (1989).
22. Id. at 219.
23. Id. at 235.
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row heavily.24 Once the farmers became hopelessly overextended, the lender allegedly reneged on its promise to provide
long-term financing.2 5 As to the borrowers' bad faith tort
claim, the court held that borrowers may not successfully assert a claim for bad faith unless the borrowers assert "the existence and breach of an enforceable contract." '26 The court

found no contract between the parties providing for long-term
financing.2 7 The borrowers had merely a "hopeful expectation" of long-term financing.28 Hopeful expectations are not
enough to create a contract, and existence of a contract is a
necessary element of a bad faith claim.2 9 Specifically, the court
stated:
Here, the entire subject matter under consideration-the
long-term loan-was at best left open to future negotiations
and agreement .... The [borrowers'] hopeful expectation

that a loan agreement would eventually be reached was simply that: an expectation. The Bank's manifestation of assent
never materialized; and no agreement was ever formed.
Under such circumstances, the Bank was under no 3legal
ob0
ligation or commitment to make a long-term loan.
Prior to the Kruse decision, successful lender liability claims
relied on courts' less restrictive view of the sanctity of contracts. 3 Courts in the mid-eighties examined how a reasonable lender might act.3 2

Presently, courts are increasingly

unwilling to examine anything outside the four corners of the
contract 33 and thus stricter views of lender liability claims
evolved rapidly.34 As the sands of lender liability continue to
shift, courts face the critical question of whether the rules
designed for nonagricultural commercial borrowers should be
applied to farmers and ranchers.
24. Id. at 220-23.
25. Id. at 223-24.
26. Kruse v. Bank of America, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217, 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1043 (1989).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 229.
29. Id. at 230.
30. Id. at 229.

31. Weissman, supra note 4, at 136.
32. See, e.g., K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 761.

33. Weissman, supra note 4, at 136-37. See also Pearson, supra note 4, at 296-97;
Rose, supra note 4, at 634.
34. Supra note 1.
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THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY

The Farmer-LenderRelationship

Farmers and ranchers argue that five attributes of the
farmer-lender relationship distinguish it from a typical borrower-lender relationship. 35 Borrowers argue these unique attributes thus merit different treatment by the court. First, farm
lenders often specialize in agricultural lending, leading farmers to expect lenders to have special expertise in structuring
successful farm loans. Second, farm lenders inject themselves
too intimately into the operation of the farm. Third, lenders
often serve as trusted financial advisers.3 6 As a result, borrowers often experience a paternalistic approach on the part of
lenders. 7 Fourth, the legal rights and obligations of farm borrowers are complex and farmers often avoid legal advice,
thereby leaving farmers particularly vulnerable to lenders.
Fifth, farm borrowers frequently prefer informal agreements,
which are common in rural communitites. Because of lenders'
paternalistic approach and borrowers' lack of expertise, borrowers argue the farmer-lender relationship transcends a simple debtor-creditor relationship.
Instead, farm lenders not
only provide credit but also become trusted financial advisers
to farmers. Having assumed this special relationship, farmers
often argue that lenders have additional duties to their
borrowers.
First, most lenders providing credit to farmers and ranchers
specialize in agricultural lending.3 9 The Farm Credit System,
for example, is the largest single source of credit for farmers
and ranchers. 40 The entities of the federal Farm Credit System
were created to provide for both long-term and short-term
35. See, e.g., Production Credit Ass'n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988).
36. See John M. Burman, Lender Liability in Wyoming, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV.
707, 721-22 (1991).
37. One group of farm borrowers went so far as to allege that the lender served
as a "father figure" to them. Mantooth v. Federal Land Bank, 528 N.E.2d 1132, 1138
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
38. See, e.g., Production Credit Ass'n, 423 N.W.2d at 546; Mantooth, 528 N.E.2d at
1138. See also, Randy Rogers, COLLIER FARM BANKRUPTCY GUIDE § 1.01 (Lawrence P.
King 1992).
39. Rogers, supra note 38, at 1-2. Farmers creditor groups typically include one
or more governmental or quasi-governmental entities.
40. H. REP. No. 295(I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2726.
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credit needs of farmers. 4 1 Likewise, the Farmers Home Ad-

ministration (FmHA) was created by Congress to provide
credit on reasonable rates and terms to farmers who could not
obtain sufficient credit elsewhere. 42 Major insurance companies and banks often have subsidiaries or units specializing in
agricultural lending. Rural bankers also tout their knowledge
of agriculture.43
Second, farmers argue that a disparity exists in bargaining
power between the farmer and the lender. This disparity may
allow lenders to inject themselves into decisions about farm
operations.44 Disparities can result from a farmer's poor
health, inexperience, lax farm accounting practices or lack of
education. 45 One trial court judge aptly noted that "some people who [are] excellent farmers [are] not particularly good at
figures or at making business decisions. ' 46 Another court correctly observed that the "farm crisis of the 1980s produced
cash-strapped and financially unsophisticated farmers who
claimed reliance upon their bank officers' oral promises to renew their loans ....

",4

Many farmers contend that, while they

may be experts at crop production or animal husbandry, they
are not experts in farm finance. 48
Third, agricultural lenders frequently become much more
involved in the day-to-day operations of the farmer borrower
than other commercial lenders. Federal law specifically authorizes federal land bank associations and production credit associations to provide "technical assistance" to borrowers as
well as "financially related services appropriate to [borrowers]
41. J.W.

LOONEY ET AL., AGRICULTURAL LAW:

ING FARM CLIENTS,

A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO REPRESENT-

59-60 (1990); 12 U.S.C. §§ 2018, 2091 (1988).

42. Id. at 60.
43. See infra note 65, for an example of an advertisement.
44. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
45. E.g., Boatmen's Nat'l Bank v. Ward, 595 N.E.2d 622, 625 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992);
accord Mantooth v. Federal Land Bank, 528 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind.Ct. App. 1988);
cf. Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188, 193 (Mont. 1984) (describing the fiduciary duty
that may arise between a lender and an unsophisticated debtor).
46. Production Credit Ass'n v. Vodak, 441 N.W.2d 338, 345 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App.
1989).
47. Rural Am. Bank v. Henrickhoff, 485 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Minn. 1992).
48. See, e.g., Production Credit Ass'n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988). It has been noted "... . farmers have sometimes been at a disadvantage
in dealing with creditors because of their lack of financial sophistication. There is a
perceived unequal relationship between farm debtors and creditors which allegedly
may cause some unfairness in the relationship." LOONEY, supra note 41, at 55.
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on farm operations." 49 Agricultural lenders often require farm
borrowers to submit extensive farm plans detailing a farmer's
expected operations.50 Sometimes lenders require borrowers
to follow their advice as a condition of receiving a loan. 5 ' In
addition, lenders may give both financial advice and farming
advice.52 Frequently, lenders will put substantial limitations
on the ability of farmers to make management decisions such
as when to buy and sell equipment 53 or when to make other
large expenditures. 54 Financial advice is not necessarily unwelcome to farmers. Because of complex government regulation
of farm credit and federal farm benefit programs, farmers usually welcome advice about farm finance. The 1989 Department
of Agriculture's Yearbook of Agriculture, for example, advises
farmers to select lenders who demonstrate "up-to-date knowledge of problems, trends and modern agricultural practices,"
49. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2076, 2093(15) (1988).
50. Nelson v. Production Credit Ass'n, 930 F.2d 599, 607 (8th Cir. 1991); Nelson
v. Production Credit Ass'n, 729 F. Supp. 677, 681 (D. Neb. 1989), cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 417 (1991); Delzer v. United Bank, 459 N.W.2d 752 (N.D. 1990); Vodak, 441
N.W.2d at 345. See also testimony ofJoe Nelson, Review of Farm Credit Issues, Hearings
Before the House Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit and Rural Development of
the Committee on Agriculture, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1990).
51. See, e.g., Nicoll v. Community State Bank, 529 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988) ("[a]s security for the Cattle Note, CSB required the Nicolls to purchase a
hedging contract ....
).
52. Nelson v. Production Credit Ass'n, 930 F.2d 599, 606-607 (8th Cir. 1991)
(Heaney, J., dissenting) (president of the PCA advised farmer to sell unrelated piece
of land and to purchase 625 feeder pigs); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods,
Inc., 824 P.2d 841, 853 (Idaho 1991) (vice-president of bank advised farmer to form
a limited partnership to raise capital); Mantooth v. Federal Land Bank, 528 N.E.2d
1132, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (PCA allegedly advised borrowers to start, then later
liquidate a hog operation); Yoest v. Farm Credit Bank, 832 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992) (Farm Credit Bank allegedly forced the borrower to sign 132 acres into
the Conservation Reserve Program); Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 803 P.2d
614, 616 (Mont. 1990) (banker allegedly advised borrower to switch from a small
cow-calf operation to a feeder cattle operation); Production Credit Ass'n v. Vodak,
441 N.W.2d 338, 345 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) ("PCA set the farm goals, the herd size,
insisted on construction of the entire barn at once, did their accounting, and told
them which bills they could pay and when to pay them."). See also Burman, supra note
38, at 721.
53. See, e.g., Production Credit Ass'n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988) (supplementary loan agreement provided that machinery and equipment
could not be sold without written consent of the PCA).
54. See, e.g., Garrett v. Bankwest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 836 (S.D. 1990) ("[a]ny
deviation from the cash flow statement required [lenders'] approval"); Bank One Elkhorn v. Jacobson, 486 N.W.2d 36, No. 91-1567 1992 WL at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr.
22, 1992) ("PCA required monthly field audits that approved or disapproved all
checks and disbursements").
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including the lenders' knowledge of government programs.55
Fourth, farmers often do not have the benefit of legal counsel. Professors Juergensmeyer and Wadley have accurately observed that "farmers, unlike most businessmen" do not have
automatic access to legal advice.5 6 Rather than consulting lawyers for preventative purposes during the decision making process, farmers often consult lawyers once a transaction has
unraveled. 5 7 Even when farmers have access to attorneys, selfreliant and cost-conscious farmers underuse their services.
Ironically, thousands of increasingly complex laws and regulations exist to confound farmers. The federal regulations governing the Farm Credit System alone span 242 pages in the
Code of Federal Regulations.58
Fifth, because rural American business often relies on a
"handshake," rural business differs greatly from business in
more urban settings. When given a choice, many farmers prefer oral agreements to written agreements, even in credit
transactions.5 9 Farmers and ranchers have relied upon oral
agreements and representations since the homesteading of agricultural America.6 ° Statements made by agricultural bankers
55.

U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,

1989 YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE:

FARM MAN-

AGEMENT 177 (1989). Nonfarm borrowers also welcome business suggestions. According to a survey conducted by the National Federation of Independent Businesses
conducted in 1982, 95% of small businesses believe that it is important or very important for their banks to give helpful business suggestions. Similarly, 55% of the
owners of small businesses believe it is important or very important that their banks
know both the borrower and the borrower's business. William C. Dunkelberg et al.,
Small Business and the Value of Bank-Customer Relationships, 14 J. BANK RESEARCH 248,
253 (1984).
56. 1JULIAN C.JUERGENSMEYER &JAMES B. WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW § 1.2, at
8 (1982). A recent survey of agricultural attorneys conducted by the American Bar
Association confirms Professors Juergens-Meyer's and Wadley's conclusions. Agricultural attorneys estimate that only 38% of farmers in their commodities "have an
adequate knowledge of their rights when dealing with bankers and other creditors.
American Bar Association Agricultural Law Committee, Survey, December 1, 1992, at
1 (copy on file with author and WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW). The same survey
reveals 34% of farmers have adequate knowledge of their legal rights when dealing
with the Farm Credit System, the Farmers Home Administration or the Agricultural
Conservation and Stabilization Service. Id.
57. Drew L. Kershen, Introduction, 21 S.D. L. REV. 479, 483 (1976).
58. See generally Farm Credit Administration, 12 C.F.R. Chapter VI (1992).
59. ROGERS, supra note 38, § 1.02, at 1-3 ("Individual credit transactions are
often oral rather than written and are typically satisfied in an informal manner.").
60. For example, an estimated 50% of farm leases in Iowa are oral leases. Jane
Easter Bahls, Don't You Trust Me? Avoiding Problems with Farm Leases, FARM FUTURES
24N (April 1987).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999

9

William Mitchell
Law MITCHELL
Review, Vol. 19,LAIss.W2 [1999],
Art. 5
WILLIAM
REVIEW

[Vol. 19

such as "we're with you" or "not to worry" often create legitimate expectations in the agricultural community that inconsistent banker action will not occur. 6 ' Similarly, because farming
is a cyclical business with good years and bad years, guarantees
of staying with the borrower in the "long haul" often create
significant expectations.6 2
The five attributes of the farmer-lender relationship demonstrate the paternalistic approach many farm lenders take toward farm borrowers. While paternalistic guidance may not be
welcomed by unsophisticated farm borrowers, one commentator has suggested that agricultural lenders have a duty "to
abide by generally accepted standards for agricultural lenders-standards which impose duties beyond those of 'normal'
lenders."63
Because agricultural lenders hold themselves out as possessing a special knowledge of agriculture, farmers often believe
agricultural lenders owe them additional or higher duties than
those owed by nonagricultural lenders to their commercial
borrowers. 0' Agricultural lenders often advertise or make oral
statements designed to create an impression of special expertise." As a result, agricultural borrowers often reasonably expect that agricultural lenders have specific expertise in
61. See, e.g., State Bank v. Curry, 476 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(dairy farmers expected bank to support them after loan officer said "we're with
you"); Interstate Prod. Credit v. MacHugh, 810 P.2d 535, 537 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)
(farmers expected not to repay one year loans right away after PCA official told them
not to worry). See also testimony ofJoe Nelson, supra note 50, at 56 ("They all have
the same story- [the PCA officer says] bring in extra money, your mortgages and
we'll stay with you. So the trusting farmer takes in his assets, and with his trust-and
shortly thereafter the Farm Credit System pulls the plug and down he goes.").
62. See, e.g., Siegner v. Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n, 820 P.2d 20, 23 (Or. Ct.
App. 1991).
63. Burman, supra note 36, at 721-22.
64. See, e.g., Ulrich v. Federal Land Bank, 480 N.W.2d 910, 911 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991).
65. See Siegner, 820 P.2d at 23 (advertising by lender stated that it would provide
financing for the "long haul.").
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agriculture and agricultural finance.66 In light of these attributes of the farmer-creditor relationship, courts should examine
whether lenders impliedly assumed additional duties and
whether those duties were breached.
B. Judicial Treatment of Duties to Agricultural Borrowers

Whether agricultural lenders owe a higher duty to their borrowers varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Courts have addressed four commonly asserted duties: fiduciary duty, the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, the duty to avoid negligent
misrepresentations, and the duty of care in structuring a loan
and rendering advice. Each of these duties is often alleged to
arise outside the four corners of a contract.
1.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Farmer borrowers frequently assert that farm lenders have
breached their fiduciary duty by giving bad advice upon which
the borrower, in turn, relies.67 If borrowers successfully conOne Farm Credit Service advertisement circulating in Montana made the following
representations:
The wrong lender can leave you with more chaff than wheat.
The standard lender's apyou. We have more than
you can plan your strategy
proach
to
financing
70 years of experience
to meet your current and
doesn't always work for
with wheat farmers. And
projected financial needs.
the wheat farming busiour loans are designed
And with
our
many
ness. And it can leave you
with built in flexibility.
payback options, you have
with a lot of chaff on the
With our fixed, adjustable
true flexibility. So call the
bottom line. Farm Credit
and variable rate loans,
lender who knows the
understands.
We offer
and the ability to convert
whole wheat business.
loan packages and finanfrom one to the other,
Call Farm Credit.
cial services designed for
(copy on file with WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW).
66. See, e.g., Siegner, 820 P.2d at 22 (loan officer told the farmer that the lender
"was the premier agricultural lender in the region, that its rates were competitive,
that defendant understood the ups and downs of the cattle market"); accord Production Credit Ass'n v. Vodak, 441 N.W.2d 338, 345 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (lender allegedly held itself out as able to give the "skillful financial advice to assist [the
borrowers] in getting the cash needed to make the operation function.").
67. See, e.g., Shaner v. United States, 976 F.2d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1992); Williams
v. Federal Land Bank, 954 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Boatmen's Nat'l Bank v.
Ward, 595 N.E.2d 622, 624-25 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992); Nicoll v. Community State Bank,
529 N.E.2d 386, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693, 69495 (Iowa 1986); Ulrich v. Federal Land Bank, 480 N.W.2d 910, 911 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991); Yoest v. Farm Credit Bank, 832 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992);
Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 803 P.2d 614, 618-19 (Mont. 1990); Production
Credit Ass'n v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1990); Waddell v. Dewey County
Bank, 471 N.W.2d 591, 593 (S.D. 1991); Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 390
N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ohio 1979); Paris v. Crawford State Bank, No. A-91-869, 1993 Neb.
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vince a court that lenders should be classified as fiduciaries,
additional obligations are imposed upon lenders outside of
those found in typical credit contracts. In other words, once a
fiduciary duty is established, "the party in whom confidence is
thus reposed must 'lay his cards on the table.'"68
A.

Case law

A survey of recent cases involving farm credit shows farmers
have argued for the imposition of six different obligations
stemming from the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the lender and the agricultural borrower. Most of these
claims have failed. First, farmers argue fiduciary duty obligates
the lender to disclose fully actions it takes or contemplates to
take regarding the borrowers' loans.6 9 For example, in Waddell
v. Dewey County Bank,70 the farmer alleged that the Bank had a
fiduciary duty to disclose the risk involved with the participation agreement. 7 ' The agreement provided that the participating banks could reject the farmer's subsequent loan
applications by changing their credit requirements. 72 The
court held the lead bank did not have to disclose the possibility
of such rejection to the borrower.73
Second, farmers argue lenders are obligated to approve conveyance of the collateral supporting the loan when the conveyance is in the best interest of the borrowers. 4 In Williams v.
FederalLand Bank, 75 the court found that the bank did not have
a fiduciary duty to accept the borrowers' proposal to sell his
App. LEXIS 1, at * 10 (Jan. 5, 1993); Bloomfield v. Nebraska State Bank, 465 N.W.2d
144, 149 (Neb. 1991); Production Credit Ass'n v. Vodak, 441 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1989); Production Credit Ass'n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 545 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988).
68. Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937).
69. Paris v. Crawford State Bank, No. A-91-869, 1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 1, at *10
(borrower alleged bank had a fiduciary duty to advise them of "all circumstances
following [their] continuing relationship ....");Waddell v. Dewey County Bank, 471
N.W.2d 591, 594 (S.D. 1991) (borrower alleged lender had fiduciary obligation to tell
borrower that the participating bank might reject subsequent loan application).
70. Waddell, 471 N.W.2d at 595.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Williams v. Federal Land Bank, 954 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (borrower
alleged violation of lender's fiduciary duty for failure to approve of sale of
plantation).
75. Id. at 774.
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mortgaged farm land.76 Even though the farmer allegedly suffered injury from the bank's refusal, the court rejected the
farmer's claim.77
Third, farmers suggest lenders must inform financially distressed borrowers of all available financial options including
bankruptcy. 7 An example of this circumstance is Boatmen's National Bank v. Ward.7 9 In Boatmen's the farmer's financial situa-

tion disintegrated to the point where the farmer could no
longer afford the credit extended to him by the Bank. 0 The
Bank, however, failed to disclose any options to the farmer to
remedy the situation, including the possibility of filing for
bankruptcy. 8 ' Thejury determined that, even though the Bank

would have incurred a substantial loss on the transaction, the
Bank's failure to suggest bankruptcy as an option was a violation of fiduciary duty.8 2 The Illinois Appellate Court sustained
the jury's determination. 3
Fourth, farmers argue that lenders must ensure that all steps
are taken to protect and preserve their collateral.8 4 For example, in Production Credit Association v. Ista,8 5 the court rejected
the farmer's claim that the bank owed the farmer a fiduciary
duty to ensure that the borrower obtained crop insurance. 6
The court found that, within the relationship between a director and a corporation, a duty exists to "act wholly for the benefit of the corporation. '8 7 However, no similar duty extended
to transactions between corporations and individual stockholder-borrowers.8 8 Thus, the court held the bank had no fiduciary duty to inform the farmer of the risk of failure to
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank v. Ward, 595 N.E.2d 622, 626-27 (Il1. Ct. App. 1992).
79. Id. at 626.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank v. Ward, 595 N.E.2d 622, 626 (Il. Ct. App. 1992).
Ultimately, the farmer did not consider the bankruptcy option because he was unaware of how to proceed with a bankruptcy transaction. Id.
84. Production Credit Ass'n v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 121-25 (N.D. 1990) (failure
to ensure that borrower obtained crop insurance).
85. Id. at 121.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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obtain insurance.8 9
Fifth, farmers argue that lenders have a duty to notify borrowers when farm plans are unsound.9 ° In Production Credit
Association v. Vodak, 9 ' the farmers relied on the bank's representations regarding their farm plan.92 The farmers followed the
bank's advice to increase their herd size but were unable to
afford or maintain the costs associated with the increased
herd. 93 Later the farmers discovered that the farm plan was
unsound because it lacked sufficient capital to pay the required
debt. 94 The court held that the factfinder could have concluded the bank had violated its duty. 95
Sixth, farmers argue banks are obligated to continue loaning
money to borrowers.9 6 In Yoest v. Farm Credit Bank, 97 the farmers alleged that they entered into a contract with a bank and
relied on the bank's promise to roll the short-term notes from
one bank into long-term notes at another.98 The court, however, held that neither bank had a fiduciary duty. 99 Further, the
court found the Yoests were experienced borrowers who managed their own property and were thus not subservient to the
requests of the bank.' 00
The facts in agricultural lender liability cases commonly alleged to support farmers' arguments that the bank has an obligation to continue loaning money to borrowers fall into a
pattern. Lenders are alleged to have required a detailed farm
financial plan that sometimes specifies the degree of participa89.
90.
1989);
1988).
91.
92.
93.
94.

Production Credit Ass'n v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1990).
Production Credit Ass'n v. Vodak, 441 N.W.2d 338, 345 (Wis. Ct. App.
Production Credit Ass'n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 545-48 (Wis. Ct. App.
Vodak, 441 N.W.2d at 344-45.
Id.
Id. at 345.
Id.

95. Id.
96. Yoest v. Farm Credit Bank, 832 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (borrower alleged obligation to roll over PCA short-term loans into FCB long-term
loans); Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 803 P.2d 614, 619 (Mont. 1990) (borrower alleged obligation to lend money under FmHA guarantee); Garrett v.
Bankwest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 837 (S.D. 1990) (borrower alleged that bank foreclosure improved bank's economic position without giving consideration to the impact of the foreclosure on the borrowers).
97. Yoest, 832 S.W.2d at 327.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 328.
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tion in federal farm programs, the crops the farmer will plant,
or the number of animals the farm will maintain in the herd.' 0
Though the farmer or rancher generally develops these plans,
lenders often require material changes prior to accepting
plans.' 0 2 Lenders often require that the borrower may neither
make major expenditures nor use cash proceeds from collateral without lender approval. 0 3 Even though lenders may exercise pervasive control in the agricultural lender-borrower
relationship, applying traditional fiduciary relationship analysis
is problematic.
b. Analysis
Fiduciary duties arise primarily in agency relationships. 0 4
In a true agency relationship, one person-the agent-consents to act on behalf of another person, the principal, in conducting the principal's affairs.' 0 5 The agent is subject to the
principal's control.' 0 6 Presumably in lender liability cases,
then, the borrowers are the putative 0 7 agents, subject to control of the putative principals, the lenders. In borrower and
lender relationships, it usually requires a stretch of imagination when borrowers argue that they are somehow acting for
lenders. 08 Rather, courts usually find that both parties are
acting in their own interest on opposite sides of a contract. 09
The fiduciary relationship commonly alleged by borrowers is
probably best described as a quasi-fiduciary relationship or a
"fiduciary-type" relationship.'
A quasi-fiduciary relationship
101. See supra text accompanying note 50.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 39-62.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 40-62.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958). See also Daniel R. Fischel,
The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 146-47 (1989).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 140 (1958).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).

107. "Putative" is defined as "reputed; supposed; commonly esteemed." BLACK'S
1237 (6th ed. 1990).
108. Burman, supra note 36 at 713-14.
109. See Fischel, supra note 104, at 147.
110. Several authors have noted this distinction between a fiduciary relationship
and a quasi-fiduciary (or special) relationship. See Burman, supra note 36, at 713-18;
Fischel, supra note 104 at 146-47; Neils B. Schuamann, The Lender As Unconventional
Fiduciary, 23 Seton Hall L. Rev. 21, 39 (1992). Several courts have classified certain
debtor-creditor relationships as quasi-fiduciary or "special relationships." See, e.g.,
High v. McLean Fin. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd sub nom., Hill v.
Equitable Trust Co., 851 F.2d 691 (3rd cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989);
LAW DICTIONARY

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999

15

William Mitchell
LawMITCHELL
Review, Vol. 19,
Iss. 2REVIEW
[1999], Art. 5
WILLIAM
LAW

[Vol. 19

is not a true agency relationship but is a relationship which
arises from special circumstances between the parties."' A
quasi-fiduciary relationship creates certain fiduciary duties, including duties for the lender to "lay the cards on the table"
and to administer the loan in a non-negligent way." 12 Typically, these special circumstances involve subservient borrowers entrusting their financial and business affairs to a lender in
13
which they have confidence.
Courts have generally found that the relationship between
lenders and borrowers is not a fiduciary-type relationship. Perhaps Judge Friendly said it best in Weinberger v. Kendrick: 1 4
"[L]ending relations between banks and large corporations are
the product of arm's-length bargaining, and it would be anomalous to require a lender to act as a fiduciary for interests on
the opposite side of the negotiating table." ' 1 5 Instead, courts
hold that the lender-borrower relationship is a contractual
debtor-creditor relationship where the parties deal at arms
length. " 6
When a fiduciary relationship is created, the lender must
avoid making misleading statements, concealing facts, or giving negligent advice.'
The essence of a fiduciary duty is the
creation of an obligation to give sound and complete information for the benefit of another. 1 8 Silence about material facts
necessary for informed decisionmaking is unacceptable in a fiduciary relationship." 9 An example of unacceptable silence in
Favors v. Matzke, 770 P.2d 686, 690 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Hutson v. Wenatchee
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 588 P.2d 1192, 1199-1200 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
111. See Favors v. Matzke, 770 P.2d at 690 (quasi-fiduciary relationship exists

where "a special relationship of trust and confidence has been developed between
the parties.").
112. See Schaumann, supra note 110, at 39-40. See also Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l
Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937).
113. See Nelson v. Production Credit Ass'n, 930 F.2d 599, 606-07 (8th Cir. 1991);
Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 841, 853 (Idaho 1991);
Mantooth v. Federal Land Bank, 528 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Yoest
v. Farm Credit Bank, 832 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. Ct. App 1992); Lachenmaier v. First Bank
Sys., Inc., 803 P.2d 614, 616 (Mont. 1990); Production Credit Ass'n v. Vodak, 441
N.W.2d 338, 345 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
114. 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983).
115. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 61.
116. See id.
117. See Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937); Deist v.
Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188, 195 (Mont. 1984).
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979).
119. See First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Iowa 1970); Nie v. Ga-
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a fiduciary type relationship includes failure to inform a borrower of the lender's plans for imminent foreclosure at the
same time the lender is seeking additional collateral. Other
examples of unacceptable conduct include failing to explain
the advantages or disadvantages of bankruptcy or federally
mandated debt restructuring programs.
As a general rule, a fiduciary duty does not require a lender
to continue loaning money indefinitely or to act only in the
best interest of the borrower. 120 Lenders have the fundamental right to enforce their contracts. In doing so, however, a
lender must be candid with a borrower about its actions and
the alternatives available to the borrower, including bankruptcy.' 2 1 In addition, as a part of the duty of candor in a fiduciary relationship, the lender should give the borrower
sufficient notice of its adverse actions. This notice will give
creditworthy borrowers the opportunity to obtain credit elsewhere. Even a lender with a fiduciary relationship to the borrower need not act forever in the best interests of a borrower.
It is not reasonable to expect a lender to perpetually extend
credit in the face of inadequate collateral or inadequate cash
flow. 122

2.

Tortious Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
FairDealing

In addition to fiduciary duties, courts must often determine
whether farm lenders have breached a duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Borrowers often assert these claims when lenders
terminate credit without a seemingly logical basis. 2 3 Parties to
a contract must act in good faith according to contract princilena State Bank & Trust Co., 387 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977).
120. Theodore H. Helmuter, Lender Liability and Fiduciary Obligation: Denturesfor a
"Toothless Lion", 6 PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 1989, at 22. Those who suggest that
finding a fiduciary relationship means that lender "is liable for almost anything" recklessly overstate their case. Id.

121. See Boatmen's Nat'l Bank v. Ward, 595 N.E.2d 622, 626-27 (Ill. Ct. App.
1992).
122. See Yoest v. Farm Credit Bank, 832 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992);
Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 803 P.2d 614, 619 (Mont. 1990).
123. In an odd twist, a federal district court recently allowed a lender's bad faith
claim against a borrower to proceed. -Riveredge Assoc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
774 F. Supp. 897 (D.NJ. 1991). In Riveredge, the lender's claim was based on the
borrower's lawsuit against the lender alleging facts inconsistent with loan documents.
Id.
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pies.' 2 4 However, agricultural borrowers argue that a breach
of the duty of good faith should result in tort damages in addition to contract damages. 25 Thus, plaintiffs are able to recover tort damages for emotional
28
damages, 2 7 and lost profits.'
a.

distress,

26

punitive

Case law

Claims asserting a breach of a duty of good faith and fair
dealing are often very general and, therefore, not successful.
In Garrettv. Bank West, Inc. ,129 the court held that the borrowers

failed to show that the lender had a "duty to refrain from doing anything that [would] injure the rights of the [borrowers]
to receive the benefits of the agreement."'' 3 0 Other claims for
tortious breach of the implied covenant have attacked the following lender conduct: a breach of an obligation to offer administrative loan forbearance under federal regulations;' 3' a

breach of an obligation not to force liquidation of collateral at
an inopportune time;' 32 and a breach of a duty of the lender's
33
regional office to act consistently with the local loan officers.

124. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977) provides that "every contract or duty within this code
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." More specifically, U.C.C. § 1-208 (1977) states that a lender may not "accelerate payment or
performance or require collateral or additional collateral 'at will' or 'when he deems
himself insecure' " unless the lender "in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired." Id.
125. Cases where farm borrowers alleged bad faith include North Cent. Kan.
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 726, 731 (Kan. 1987); Ulrich v. Federal Land
Bank, 480 N.W.2d 910, 911 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); First Sec. Bank & Trust v. VZ
Ranch, 807 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Mont. 1991); Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 803
P.2d 614, 618 (Mont. 1990); Production Credit Ass'n v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 121-25
(N.D. 1990); Garrett v. BankWest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 842 (S.D. 1990).
Cases where nonfarm borrowers alleged bad faith include McAlister v. Citibank,
829 P.2d 1253, 1258-59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal.
Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Bottrell v. American Bank, 773
P.2d 694, 704 (Mont. 1989); Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, 704 P.2d 409, 419 (Mont.
1985); Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 714 (N.D. 1989).
126. See Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 555 (Cal.
App. 1985).
127. Id. at 552-53.
128. See, e.g., R.E.T. Corp. v. Frank Paxton, 329 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1983). Lost
profits are more difficult to recover in breach of contract claims because of the notion
that damages must be reasonably foreseeable. Id.
129. 459 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1990).
130. Id. at 841.
131. See, e.g.,
Production Credit Ass'n v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990).
132. First Sec. Bank v. VZ Ranch, 807 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Mont. 1991).
133. See, e.g., Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 803 P.2d 614 (Mont. 1990).
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Although some courts recognize the tort of bad faith when
insurance companies reject the claims of the insured party arising under insurance contracts, 3 4 the great weight of authority
denies the imposition of tort damages for a breach of the im13 5
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in agricultural
and nonagricultural debtor-creditor relationships.1 36 In fact,
in Montana and California, the two leading states in developing theories of tortious breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in banking relationships,
courts have recently
37
rejected claims for tort damages.
b.

Analysis

Courts should deny recovery of tort damages for a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in debtorcreditor relationships. Good faith obligations should arise only
from the terms of the contract. Parties ought to be able to bargain for contract terms and engage in an efficient breach of the
contract without courts imposing tort damages thus depriving
the parties of the benefits of their bargains. 3 8 As the court
accurately noted in State National Bank v. Academia, Inc.,139 the
134. See generally WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF, SANFORD M. GAGE & HARVEY R. LEVINE,
INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION (1992).

135. See, e.g., Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 824 P.2d 841, 85051 (Idaho 1991); North Central Kan. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 726,
731 (Kan. 1987); Vicich v. Federal Land Bank, 480 N.W.2d 910, 911 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991); Lachenmaier, 803 P.2d at 617-18 (Mont. 1990); Garrett v. Bankwest, Inc., 459
N.W.2d 833, 842 (S.D. 1990).
136. See also Betterton v. First Interstate Bank, 800 F.2d 732, 733 (8th Cir. 1986);
Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1988); Keeton v. Bank of Red Bay,
466 So. 2d 937, 938 (Ala. 1985); State Nat'l Bank v. Academia, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 282,
284 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
137. The Montana case of First National Bank v. Twombly recognized tort damages
for breaches of a duty of good faith in a debtor-creditor relationship. 689 P.2d 1226
(Mont. 1984). See also Weinberg v. Farmers State Bank, 752 P.2d 719 (Mont. 1988);
Noonan v. First Bank, 740 P.2d 631, 632 (Mont. 1987); Tribby v. Northwestern Bank,
704 P.2d 409, 412 (Mont. 1985). More recently, the Montana Supreme Court refused to allow awards of tort damage for breaches of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in bank/borrower relationships. See, e.g., Lachenmaier, 803 P.2d at 617-18.
In California, tort damages for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing were awarded in banker/depositor relationships. See Commercial
Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). More
recently, California courts have rejected the doctrine in lender/borrower relationships. See, e.g., Careau & Co. v. Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 272 Cal. Rptr. 387
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989); Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Ct., 260 Cal. Rptr. 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
138. See Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 774-76 (Mont. 1990).
139. 802 S.W.2d 282, 293 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
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obligation of good faith "is a derivative principle and does not
create an independent [tort] cause of action."' 4 °
Allowing courts to impose tort damages for unfair conduct
between contracting parties allows a court to second guess the
parties' contract terms and results in the creation of good faith
responsibilities outside the four corners of the contract. 4 1 As
Judge Frank Easterbrook succinctly stated: "Any attempt to
add an overlay of 'just cause' . . . to the exercise of contractual
privileges would reduce commercial certainty and breed costly
litigation.

",142

The circumstances of the agricultural

debtor-creditor relationship are not sufficiently distinct from
other debtor-creditor relationships to justify tort damages for
all unfair conduct.
3.

Negligent Misrepresentation

Borrowers' claims of negligent misrepresentation have met
with greater success. Borrowers can claim the tort of negligent
misrepresentation by demonstrating that the lenders supplied
them with false information for their business use. 4 3 The
claim of negligent misrepresentation has been frequently litigated in agricultural lender liability cases.'

44

Most courts rec-

ognize that the parties to a contract have a duty to take
140. Id.
141. A California Court of Appeals noted that hopeful expectations of continued
credit should not be protected: "Here, the entire subject matter under consideration-the long term loan-was at best left open to future negotiations and agreement
....
Under such circumstances, the Bank was under no legal obligation or commitment to make a long-term loan." Kruse v. Bank of America, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217, 229
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043 (1989).
142. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.
1990).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1965).
144. See Nicoll v. Community State Bank, 529 N.E.2d 386, 391 (Ind. Ct. App.
1,988); Bank One Elkhorn v. Jacobson, 486 N.W.2d 36 (table) (text in Westlaw) (Wis.
Ct. App. 1992); Production Credit Ass'n v. Vodak, 441 N.W.2d 338, 344 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1989); Production Credit Ass'n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988).
Negligent misrepresentation cases are also increasingly common in nonfarm
lender liability cases. See Phoenix Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades,
Inc., 856 F.2d 1125, 1126 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1340 (1989); McAlister v. Citibank, 829 P.2d 1253, 1261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Gilmore v. Ute City Mortgage Co., 660 F. Supp. 437, 438 (D. Colo. 1986); Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v.
Williams, 262 Cal. Rptr. 260, 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604
A.2d 521, 523 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Frame v. Boatmen's Bank, 824 S.W.2d 491,
492 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Bottrell v. American Bank, 773 P.2d 694, 705 (Mont. 1989);
Banker's Trust Co. v. Steenburn, 409 N.Y.S.2d 51, 66-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
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reasonable steps to supply accurate and straight forward information. Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
("Section 552") states:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance
of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability
for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable
care or competence
in obtaining or communicating the
45
information. 1
The comments to Section 552 provide that the obligation to
supply accurate information exists "only when the defendant
has a pecuniary interest in the transaction in which the information is given."' 14 6 Clearly, lenders have a pecuniary interest
in transactions with their borrowers. As a result, lenders making statements for the benefit of agricultural borrowers must
comply with Section 552's requirements and must refrain from
47
giving false information.
Unlike actions for fraud or deceit, in negligent misrepresentation actions the borrower need not plead and prove that the
lender intentionally misstated the facts.14 8 Instead, the borrower must simply prove the lender acted negligently. 149 Furthermore, the lender's liability extends only to those
circumstances in which the lender is aware of how the borrower will use the information and intends to supply the information for that purpose. 50 The prohibition against negligent
misrepresentation furthers the social policy "of encouraging
the flow of commercial information upon which the operation

of the economy rests.'

5

1

a. Case law
Borrowers have asserted negligent misrepresentation claims
in three types of lender liability cases. First, borrowers claim
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1965). See also W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, 745-48 (5th ed. 1984).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. cmt. c, at 129.
See supra text accompanying note 117.
See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1965).
Id. § 552 cmt. a (1965).
Id.
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that lenders have given them operational advice and falsely
represented their expertise. In Production Credit Association v.
Vodak,' 52 the lenders advised the borrowers to expand a farm
operation. The lender refused to finance construction of half a
barn to house a small increase in herd size.15 3 Instead, the
lender required construction of a full barn and a sizable expansion in herd size prior to approving a loan for the borrower.54
The borrower argued that the plan was developed by the
lender, and implementation of the plan was carefully supervised by the lender. i 55 The borrower claimed the expansion
plan was unworkable because it failed to provide for maintenance of the expanded herd.' 56 The court held that the borrower's claim survived a motion for summary judgment
because the lender held itself out as having expertise to advise
57
the borrower. 1

Second, borrowers claim negligent misrepresentation where
lenders allegedly promised to extend or continue extending
credit. In Gilmore v. Ute City Mortgage Co. ,158 the United States
District Court in Colorado sustained a claim for negligent misrepresentation based on an alleged promise by the loan officer
that loan committee approval would be forthcoming. 15 ' Likewise, in BottreUI v. American Bank, 6 ' the Montana Supreme
Court recognized a claim for negligent misrepresentation
where a lender promised to assist the borrower in obtaining
long term financing from another source.' 6 ' The same court
noted in an earlier case that a lender's insertion of an amount
in a corporate borrowing resolution may be sufficient to give
152. 441 N.W.2d 338, 345 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). For a case involving a lender
supplying false information regarding expansion of a nonfarm business, see Security
Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 262 Cal. Rptr. 260, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
153. Vodak, 441 N.W.2d at 340 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
154. Id. at 345.
155. Id.
156. Id.

157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Ute City Mortgage Co., 660 F. Supp. 437, 440-41 (D.
Colo. 1985). These cases involve one or more of a series of related claims.
159. Id. See also Frame v. Boatmen's Bank, 824 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) (noting that borrower's reliance on officer's statement that bank would lend
money presents an issue of fact that cannot be disposed of in summary nature).
160. Bottrell v. American Bank, 773 P.2d 694, 706 (Mont. 1989) (recognizing negligent misrepresentation where lender promised to assist SBA in obtaining long term
financing while the bank was obtaining additional collateral to accomplish a set-off).
161. Id.
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rise to an expectation that the funds will be provided.' 62 In
State Bank v. Maryann's, Inc.,6

s

the Montana court acknowl-

edged that the borrower's action would create a claim for negligent misrepresentation. 64 Borrowers may also claim that a
lender has promised to continue extending credit to the borrower.'"65 In Hill v. Equitable Bank,' 6 6 the United States District
Court, applying Maryland law, noted that lenders have a duty
to avoid misrepresentation concerning the safety of an investment under certain circumstances. 6 7
b. Analysis
Negligent misrepresentation claims against agricultural
lenders are sometimes appropriate, since agricultural lenders
frequently purport to specialize in agricultural lending and extol their knowledge of agricultural finance and credit to attract
borrowers. 68 Lenders inject themselves into agricultural operations by providing financial and business advice. 169 As a re-

sult, farmers rely on statements made by lenders about farm
finance.' 70 Just as customers of other professionals can pursue
claims against professional "advice givers" using negligent
misrepresentation theories,' 7' agricultural lenders should be
held to the same standard. Lenders should be responsible for
their own advice when they hold themselves out as having special expertise in farm finance.
Where borrowers claim that lenders negligently misrepre162. State Bank v. Maryann's, Inc., 664 P.2d 295, 302 (Mont. 1983) (amount

stated in borrowing resolution created an expectation).
163. Id. at 302.
164. Id.
165. Id.

166. 655 F. Supp. 631, 651 (D. Del. 1987).
167. Id.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
169. See, e.g., Production Credit Ass'n v. Vodak, 441 N.W.2d 338, 345 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1989).
170. See id.
171. Wolther v. Schaarschmidt, 738 P.2d 25 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (liability of
engineer hired to perform structural analysis); First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co.,
558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990) (liability of accountant to bank); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v.
First Bancorp, 772 P.2d 720, 722 (Idaho 1989) (liability of accountant to bank);
Stockier v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70, 82 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (liability of accountants);
Stinson v. Brand, 738 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tenn. 1987) (liability of attorneys in real
estate transaction); Gilmore v. Ute City Mortgage Co., 660 F. Supp. 437 (D. Colo.
1985) (basing negligent misrepresentation claim on lender's alleged statement that
loan committee approval would be obtained).
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sented that credit would be extended or continued, courts
must carefully analyze whether lenders gave any false information. Clearly, inaccurate or misleading statements which legitimately and actually create expectations should be
considered false information. On the other hand, predictions
of future conduct expressed by the lenders should not always
72
be grounds for negligent misrepresentation.
Even if statements made about extension of credit are more
akin to opinions, courts should not rule out claims of negligent
misrepresentation:
The rule stated in [Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552]
applies not only to information given as to the existence of
facts but also to an opinion given upon facts equally well
known to both the supplier and the recipient. Such an opinion is often given by one whose only knowledge
of the facts
73
is derived from the person who asks it.1
Of course, courts should not hold lenders responsible for all
representations that are inaccurate. Rather, lenders should
only be held responsible for those misstatements which result
from the lender's failure "to exercise reasonable care or com1 74
petence in obtaining or communicating the information."
Borrowers should be entitled to expect that lenders will exercise care and competence when making statements. Specifically, borrowers are entitled to expect that lenders have done a
reasonable and adequate investigation of the validity of material statements likely to cause reliance. Borrowers are also entitled to expect agricultural lenders to have business and
7 5 If
professional competence typically possessed by lenders.
the information given by lenders expresses an opinion, borrowers should be entitled "to expect a careful consideration of
the facts and competence in arriving at an intelligent
172. Lenders often state that given the information they have, credit should be
forthcoming. Some courts have catagorically stated that promises of future conduct
(including promises to continue credit) are not actionable negligent misrepresentations. See McAlister v. Citibank, 829 P.2d 1253, 1261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Bank of
Shaw v. Posey, 573 So. 2d 1355, 1360 (Miss. 1990).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. b (1977). See also Parker v. Co-

lumbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521, 528 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (statements on qualifications of loan officer and builder not actionable because they constitute opinions).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
175. Id. cmt. e (recipients of information not currently known to them in the
course of a transaction are entitled to expect that the supplier will exercise the care
and competence required by the business or profession in acquiring the
information).
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judgment."' 1 76

4. Negligent Breach of Duty of Care
Borrowers cannot prevail on claims of negligent misrepresentation in agricultural lender liability suits if borrowers cannot specifically identify the false statements made by the
lenders. Further, borrowers must demonstrate reliance on the
lender's false statement. However, the borrowers can still allege that the lenders were negligent either in the evaluation or
administration of loans 77 or in giving advice to borrowers in
conjunction with loans. 7 " These claims, similar to professional malpractice claims, assert that lenders have undertaken
a special duty to act in a nonnegligent fashion.
Courts have not been consistent in their reasoning and conclusions when deciding whether lenders have duties to avoid
negligent administration of loans and loan applications. Some
courts find that lenders owe a duty of care to borrowers in
processing loans.' 79 Other courts reject that position. 8 0 Some
courts indicate a willingness to find duties of care only in fiduciary-type relationships.' 8 '

a. Duty of Care
Whether a claim of negligence succeeds usually depends
upon whether the court finds a duty to provide the service or
whether the lender failed to take the action. Prosser and Keeton properly recognize the difficulty in determining when a
duty exists. Prosser and Keeton conclude that "[n]o better
general statement can be made than that the courts will find a
duty where, in general, reasonable persons would recognize it
and agree that it exists." 182 Despite some uncertainty, it is well
established that a person undertaking a business or profession
176. Id.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 187-199.
178. See infra text accompanying notes 199-204.
179. See, e.g., High v. McLean Fin. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561, 1568 (D.D.C. 1987);
Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756 (Md. 1986).
180. See, e.g., Nelson v. Production Credit Ass'n, 729 F. Supp. 677, 687 (D. Neb.
1989); Gilmore v. Ute City Mortgage Co., 660 F. Supp. 437, 440 (D. Colo. 1986);
Ulrich v. Federal Land Bank, 480 N.W.2d 910, 912-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
181. Wagner v. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Production
Credit Ass'n v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1990); Production Credit Ass'n v.
Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
182. KEETON, supra note 145, § 53.
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"is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities."''8

3

As a result, highly skilled

individuals, such as attorneys, physicians, architects, and public accountants face exposure to liability if they fail to exercise
the level of skill common to those active in the profession." 4
These duties also apply to less skilled persons engaging in
trades such as electricians, carpenters, and plumbers.' 5 Similar duties have been imposed upon lenders whom borrowers
86
rely on for their expertise.

b. Negligent Evaluation or Administration of a Loan
Borrowers commonly claim that lenders negligently evaluated and administered their loan, despite the lenders' special
skills and knowledge. Claims for negligent loan evaluation and
administration fall into four categories. First, borrowers often
allege that lenders have breached a duty to evaluate a loan,
loan application, or a loan modification request in accordance
with prudent and reasonable lending procedures. 8 7 Second,
borrowers claim that lenders have a duty not to approve a loan
application where proceeds of the loan would be invested in a
high-risk venture.' 8 8 The borrowers maintain that approving
such loans, in the face of high risk, constitutes negligence on
183.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS §

299A (1965).

184. Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756, 763 (Md. 1986).
185.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A cmt. b (1965).

186. SeeJacques, 515 A.2d at 764; Erlich v. First Nat'l Bank, 505 A.2d 220, 234-38
(NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
187. See, e.g., Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Baker, 967 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1992)
(lender allegedly miscomputed net worth of borrower in failing to renegotiate the
loan); Nelson v. Production Credit Ass'n, 930 F.2d 599, 605 (8th Cir. 1991) (borrower alleged reasonable "duty on a lender to use reasonable care in making a
loan"); High v. McLean Fin. Corp. 659 F. Supp. 1561 (D.D.C. 1987) (lender allegedly
failed to process loan application with good care); Gilmore v. Ute City Mortgage Co.,
660 F. Supp. 437, 440 (D. Colo. 1986) (borrower alleged negligent handling of loan
application and failure to behave in a commercially reasonable and diligent manner);
Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756 (Md. 1986) (lender failed to evaluate loan
applications for purchase of house); Bevier v. Production Credit Ass'n, 429 N.W.2d
287, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (lender allegedly failed to follow policies under Farm
Credit Act); Paris v. Crawford State Bank, No. A-91-869, 1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 1, at
*22 (lender allegedly failed to follow new lending procedure and study borrowers
proposed cash flow reductions).
188. See, e.g.,
Wagner v. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(borrowers alleged bank was negligent in failing to inform borrowers that borrowers
were about to invest loan proceeds in a risky venture).
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the part of lenders.' 8 9 Third, some borrowers contend that
lenders act negligently by making or structuring loans which
borrowers are unable to repay. 9 ' Finally, borrowers assert
negligence when lenders fail to take reasonable steps to protect the value of the collateral.' 9 ' Several courts have hesitated
to accept these negligence theories because such acceptance
could permit recovery of tort damages for a breach of the
debtor-creditor contract.
Courts ought to reject negligence claims where the claim, in
effect, creates duties which extend beyond the debtor-creditor
contract and for which the parties to the contract have not bargained. 1 92 When a borrower's claim that a lender breached its
duty of care is really a claim for negligent breach of contract,
courts properly reject the borrower's claim.193 Courts are wise
to avoid converting breach of contract claims into tort actions.
As Prosser and Keeton correctly argue, duties created by contract ought to be governed by the law of contract and not be
94
convertible into tort claims. '
In debtor-creditor relationships, the risk of inadequate cash
flow or inadequate collateral to satisfy a loan falls first and
foremost on borrowers. Accepting the argument that lenders
have a duty to make only those loans that borrowers will repay
would efficiently eliminate the borrower's contractual duty to
repay the loan. Likewise, the duty to preserve the value of collateral and insure adequate cash flow is not that of the lender.
Rather, the obligation to preserve the value of business assets,
as well as maximize profits and cash flow, is that of the borrower. Transferring the obligation to operate as responsible
business persons from borrowers to lenders could encourage
borrowers to engage in sloppy business practices. Borrowers,
armed with the knowledge that courts might later force lenders
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Nelson v. Production Credit Ass'n, 729 F. Supp. 677, 687 (D. Neb.
1989); Ulrich v. Federal Land Bank, 480 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Richland
Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Swenson, 816 P.2d 1045, 1050 (Mont. 1991); Gries v. First Wis.
Nat'l Bank, 264 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Wis. 1978); Production Credit Ass'n v. Croft, 423
N.W.2d 544, 548 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
191. See, e.g., Production Credit Ass'n v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 125 (N.D. 1990)
(failure to acquire crop insurance).
192. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Ute City Mortgage Co., 660 F. Supp. 437, 440 (D. Colo.
1986); Production Credit Ass'n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
193. See infra text accompanying notes 205-218.
194. KEETON, supra note 145, § 92.
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to make them whole, might be inclined to take undue risks.
Courts should avoid creating duties that allocate risks inconsistent with the terms of contracts and general commercial
practices.
In the absence of a fiduciary duty, courts examining agricultural debtor-credit relationships have rejected claims that lenders have a duty to make loan decisions consistent with their
internal loan policies.1 95 Courts have also refused to find agricultural lenders governed by the Farm Credit System liable
under state law for failure to follow the policies of the federal
96
Farm Credit Act.1
The analysis and reasoning of these courts is sound for three
reasons. First, the decision to terminate credit is best governed by contract law. One of the most fundamental terms of
a credit contract is the date on which the credit is due. Courts
should not supplement the terms of credit contracts to create a
duty contained in the contract, unless the contracts expressly
provide that credit determinations will be made in accordance
with reasonable or identifiable standards.
Second, courts should not require lenders to continue lending money indefinitely, even if borrowers meet the loan standards in effect at the time of the original loan. Banks and other
lenders periodically react to the changing economy by modifying loan policies, in accordance with the changing requirements of regulators and the changing priorities of individual
lenders.
Third, even if a lender has specific lending standards, application of the standards to a borrower's situation is highly subjective. 197 For example, empirical studies show that the quality
of the farm's management, measured by the farmer's character
and ability, is the most important factor in making credit deci195. See, e.g., Nelson v. Production Credit Ass'n, 729 F. Supp. 677 (D. Neb. 1989);
Ulrich v. Federal Land Bank, 480 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Croft, 423
N.W.2d at 544.
196. See, e.g., Sierra-Bay Fed. Land Bank v. Superior Ct., 277 Cal. Rptr. 753, 761
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Yankton Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Jensen, 416 N.W.2d 860, 864
(S.D. 1987); Federal Land Bank v. Jensen, 415 N.W.2d 155, 158 (S.D. 1987); Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n v. MacHugh, 810 P.2d 535, 538-39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991);
Production Credit Ass'n v. Van Iperen, 396 N.W.2d 35, 37-38 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
197. See Cole R. Gustafson, Credit Evaluation: Monitoring the FinancialHealth of Agriculture, 71 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1145 (1989); Roger D. Stover et al., Agricultural Landing Decision: A MultiattributeAnalysis, 67 AM. J. AGRIC. EcON. 513 (1985).
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sions.'9

s

Courts should neither second guess the contract

terms negotiated by the parties nor second guess the credit decisions made by the lender pursuant to those terms. In the
interest of protecting the parties' right to bargain, borrowers'
claims based solely on the lenders' alleged negligent evaluation or administration of a loan should generally fail.
c.

Breach of Duty to Provide Competent FinancialAdvice
ConcerningAgricultural Finance

In general, the relative duties of lenders and borrowers
should be ascertained by the law of contracts. However, courts
may call for additional duties on the part of lenders in special
circumstances. The nature of the relationship between an agricultural borrower and agricultural lender may create special
circumstances, since the agricultural debtor-creditor relationship is built on a degree of trust not found in many commercial
contracts. These relationships occur when the lender acts not
only as a commercial creditor but also serves as a business or
financial advisor.' 9 When lenders assume a professional advisory relationship, borrowers are apt to look to the lenders' expertise regarding matters affecting the borrowers' livelihood.
An agricultural lender, however, may assume the role of a
professional advisor in matters of farm finance without additionally assuming a fiduciary role.20 0 Much less is required for
the bank to assume the role of a professional advisor. If a
lender holds itself out as an expert and as a result the borrower
reposes faith, confidence, and trust in the lender, the lender
becomes an advisor and is responsible for its negligent conduct. As the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
state:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or
knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the
practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the
skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that
profession or trade in good standing in similar
communities. 201
198. Id. at 517-18.
199. See supra text and accompanying notes 49-55.
200. In a fiduciary relationship, a substantial power disparity exists, and the lender
asserts its power to exercise dominion over the borrower. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
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The obligation to exercise skill and knowledge described in
the Restatement sometimes applies to agricultural lenders.
Lenders in rural America frequently hold themselves out as
having special expertise in agricultural finance or other aspects
of agricultural business. Even if that expertise is offered gratuitously and is not explicitly part of the debtor-creditor contract, lenders have a responsibility to use the skill and
knowledge ordinarily possessed by agricultural lenders.2 °2
When the lender has voluntarily undertaken to provide special
advice, imposition of liability for negligently given advice is
justified.20 3 To discourage negligent performance of lender
duties, lenders assuming advisory roles should be held responsible for the "professional" advice given.
Before holding a lender responsible for the "professional
advice" negligently given, the court must determine whether a
particular lender has represented itself as possessing special
knowledge. The duty of a lender to avoid negligence in providing business and financial advice arises only when the
lender assumes the role of financial advisor. To ascertain
whether a lender holds itself out in this role, courts should examine statements made in advertisements and oral statements
which may suggest expertise in a certain area. Courts should
also examine the history of the relationship between the lender
and borrower to ascertain whether the borrower frequently
sought advice, whether the lender gave frequent advice, and
whether the borrowers were unsophisticated in matters relating to the advice given.20 4 If a court finds that the lender is
negligent in giving advice concerning farm matters and that
202. The duties described in § 299A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS do
not "depend upon the existence of an enforceable contract between the parties." Id.
cmt. c, at 74. Likewise, these duties apply to service rendered gratuitously. Id.
203. Id. ("The basis of the rule is the undertaking of the defendant, which may
arise apart from contract.")
204. See Production Credit Ass'n v. Vodak, 441 N.W.2d 338, 345 (Wis. Ct. App.
1989). In Vodak, the court stated:
We conclude that the factfinder could infer that PCA adopted a role respecting the Vodaks' farm operation and the financial repayment plan which went
beyond the role of a lender. Whether PCA was negligent in performing the
additional responsibilities which it assumed is for the factfinder to determine.
The factfinder could also infer that the farm plan was a representation
to the Vodaks that if it was followed, they would have a successful operation.
The factfinder could find that the plan was flawed in that its objectives could
not be accomplished.
Id. at 345. But see Nicoll v. Community State Bank, 529 N.E.2d 386, 391 (Ind. Ct.
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the borrower reasonably relied on the advice, then the lender
should be held liable.
IV.

WRITTEN CREDIT AGREEMENT STATUTES

In recent years, a majority of states have enacted legislation
to curtail lender liability claims.20 5 Some states enacted statutes to protect lenders from "having to litigate claims of oral
promises to renew agricultural credit. 20 6 Backed by banking
interests, these statutes are designed to protect lenders from
liability for oral comments, thereby increasing commercial
20 7
certainty.
States have enacted two primary types of legislation limiting
lender liability claims-statute of fraud legislation and credit
agreement legislation. The former provides that certain contracts to extend credit are invalid unless the contracts are in
writing. 2 8 Credit agreement statutes are much broader in
scope. Not only do these statutes require a writing, but they
also prohibit courts from implying the existence of credit
agreements from fiduciary relationships or by promissory estoppel.2 °9 Some credit agreement statutes go so far as to provide that "the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a
debtor" shall not "give rise to a claim that a new credit agreement is created. ' 21 While many states use a statute of fraud to
create a defense to contract actions, the statutes do not create
a defense to breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, or other negligence claims. 21 1 The effect of credit agreeApp. 1988) (declining to "extend the tort of negligent misrepresentation to include
negligent professional advice.").
205. See supra note 4.
206. See Rural Am. Bank v. Herickhoff, 485 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992). The court stated:
The farm credit crisis of the 1980s produced cash-strapped and financially
unsophisticated farmers who claimed reliance upon their bank officers' alleged oral promises to renew their loans. Numerous lawsuits arose over the
bankers' alleged oral promises. The credit agreement statute was passed to
prevent the litigation of such difficult claims.
Id.
207. See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 4, at 297 n.l 1.
208. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1624 (West Supp. 1992).
209. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-10-124 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. § 513.33
(1992).
210. MINN. STAT. § 513.33 (1992). Cf Rural Am. Bank v. Herickhoff, 473 N.W.2d
361, 363 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (credit agreement should not be implied from ongoing relationship).
211. Weissmann, supra note 4, at 138-39.
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ment statutes on these claims is less certain.
Because of the diversity of the credit agreement statutes, it is
difficult to summarize the effect of state statutes on duty-based
lender liability tort claims.21 2 Generally, credit agreement statutes serve to limit some of these claims. States enacting legislation most favorable to lenders require that credit agreements
arising from fiduciary duties or from lenders rendering financial advice must be in writing.21 " As a result, if a borrower
claims that a fiduciary relationship creates an obligation to
forebear on collection, the claim is barred by statute unless a
written agreement to forebear exists. Similarly, courts have rejected claims that a lender must continue to loan money if the
borrower follows the oral advice of the lender.21 4
Borrowers in states with credit agreement statutes who seek
to hold lenders liable for fiduciary responsibilities, such as the
obligation to inform them of all available options or the obligation to refrain from giving negligent financial and business advice, should not ask the courts to enforce oral credit
agreements. Borrowers should seek neither to modify credit
terms nor to modify other accommodation terms. Instead,
borrowers should seek damages for breach of a fiduciary duty
to provide sound guidance to the borrower.
Credit agreement statutes may also provide a defense to
some negligent misrepresentation claims. While some courts
have recognized that credit agreement statutes permit some
types of fraud claims, ' 5 it is less clear how credit agreement
statutes affect negligent misrepresentation claims. Most state
statutes do not expressly preclude actions based on negligent
misrepresentations. 21 6 Those statutes that limit claims for
negligent misrepresentation apply only if the effect of the tort
212. Id. at 139.
213. See, e.g. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 7102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); MINN.
STAT. § 513.33 (1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6.1123 (B) (West Supp. 1991).
214. Becker v. First Am. State Bank, 420 N.W.2d 239, 240-41 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988).
215. See, e.g., Fronning v. Blume, 429 N.W.2d 310, 312-13 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(credit agreement statute did not bar claim of fraud in the inducement of contract).
See also Ingvalson v. Habberstad, No. C6-89-46, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 854 (Minn.
Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1989). But see Northwest Bank Montevideo v. General Dryer Corp.,
No. C4-89-1986, 1990 Minn. App. LEXIS 328 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1990).
216. Weissman, supra note 4, at 142. At least one state, however, precludes actions for negligent misrepresentation if the effect of the negligent misrepresentation
is to create an oral credit agreement. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-10-107 (Law. Co-op.
1991).
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would be to establish an oral agreement to provide credit or
accommodation. 1 7 Since many negligent misrepresentation
claims do not seek to establish or to modify a credit agreement,
the statutes may not apply. Instead, borrowers seek damages
for lost profits due to reliance on the lender's negligent business or financial advice, and the statutes do not bar such a
claim.
Credit agreement statutes, however, often preclude some
claims alleging negligence. If a claim for negligent administration of a loan has the effect of creating an obligation to extend
credit or provide a financial accommodation under a credit
agreement, the claim may be barred by credit agreement statutes. Therefore, a claim that a bank failed to follow its internal
policies and refused to extend the due date of the loan may be
precluded by the broadest of the credit agreement statutes. A
claim that the lender held itself out as having special expertise
as a financial advisor and was negligent in rendering advice
should not be precluded by credit agreement statutes. In these
instances, the borrower is not seeking to establish a credit
agreement but instead is simply attempting to recover damages for negligently rendered professional advice.
The purpose of credit agreement statutes is to add certainty
to loan contracts. The statutes are not intended to allow lenders to breach duties arising from special circumstances of the
relationship between two parties.21 a As a result, courts should
construe credit agreement statutes narrowly. Tort actions that
have the effect of alleging an agreement to extend, continue or
modify a credit agreement should be barred by these statutes.
Tort actions should be allowed if they allege a breach of duties
arising separately from the contractual relationship.
V.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPROPRIATE DUTIES BETWEEN
FARMER AND LENDER

Because of the complexity of many farmer/lender relationships and the special circumstances surrounding agricultural
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 535.17 (b) (West Supp. 1991). The purpose of the
Iowa statute is clearly stated: "To ensure that contract actions and defenses on credit
agreements are supported by clear and certain written proof of the terms of such
agreements to protect against fraud and to enhance the clear and predictable understanding of rights and duties under credit agreements." Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999

33

William Mitchell
Law MITCHELL
Review, Vol. 19,LAIss.W2 REVIEW
[1999], Art. 5
WILLIAM

[Vol. 19

credit, courts have had difficulty categorizing the appropriate
types of relationships between farmer and lender. While
courts should avoid categorical rules to classify farmer-lender
relationships, it is clear that most farmer-lender relationships
are not fiduciary relationships. Even when the relationship between a farmer and lender falls short of a fiduciary relationship, the special circumstances of the relationship might still
create a duty to avoid negligent misrepresentations or provide
competent credit advice.
A. Fanner Lender Relationships Are Not Usually Fiduciary
Relationships
Courts should find a fiduciary relationship rather than a contractual one in an agricultural debtor-creditor relationship
only when each of the following three conditions exists: First,
the borrower must actually repose faith, confidence and trust
in the lender. 2 19 Second, a substantial power disparity must

exist between the borrower and the lender due to the borrower's age, mental capacity, mental or economic duress,
health, education, and degree of business experience. 2
Third, the lender must use its power to exercise dominion over
the borrower 2in
a way not reasonably necessary to protect the
21
lender's loan.

The facts in the typical agricultural debtor-creditor dispute
generally do not satisfy these conditions. While the first condition is often satisfied because members of the agricultural
219. Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106-08 (Ariz. 1937);
Fridenmaker v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 534 P.2d 1064, 1068-71 (Ariz. App. 1975); Boatmen's Nat'l Bank v. Ward, 595 N.E.2d 622, 625-28 (Il. App. Ct. 1992); Denison State
Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241-43 (Kan. 1982); Ulrich v. Federal Land Bank,
480 N.W.2d 910, 911 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1977); Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 721 (N.D. 1989); Waddell v. Dewey County Bank, 471 N.W.2d 591, 593-94 (S.D. 1991); Garrett v.
Bankwest, Inc., 459 N.W. 2d 833, 837-39 (S.D. 1990); Production Credit Ass'n v.
Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 546-48 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979).
220. Boatmen's Nat'i Bank v. Ward, 595 N.E.2d at 625-28; Denison State Bank v.
Madeira, 640 P.2d at 1241-43; Yoest v. Farm Credit Bank, 832 S.W.2d 325, 328-29
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 721; Waddell v.
Dewey County Bank, 471 N.W.2d at 594-95; Garrett v. Bankwest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d at
838-39; Production Credit Ass'n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 546-48 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988); Yuster v. Keefe, 90 N.E. 920 (Ind. App. 1910).
221. Farmer City State Bank v. Guingrich, 487 N.E.2d 758, 764-65 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985); Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 721; Waddell v. Dewey County
Bank, 471 N.W.2d at 595; Garrett v. Bankwest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d at 837-39.
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community generally have a stronger trust and faith in one another than they do in nonagricultural commercial communities, the second and third conditions are not satisfied.222 As to
the second condition, courts should not presume that a substantial disparity of power exists between agricultural borrowers and lenders. Lenders may be more knowledgeable about
farm finance, but borrowers are usually more knowledgeable
about the business of crop production and animal husbandry.
In analyzing whether farmers are subservient to lenders, courts
must recognize that financially stable farmers usually have
many financing alternatives, perhaps more than many nonfarm commercial borrowers. Federal agencies such as the
Farmers Home Administration and Farm Credit System provide farmers with numerous credit alternatives. Likewise,
farming is a capital intensive business and is usually attractive
to collateral conscious banks and insurance company lenders.
Finally, the third condition necessary to find a fiduciary relationship is usually not satisfied. Despite power disparity,
courts should look carefully at the particular facts and circumstances before concluding that the lender exercises unnecessary dominion over the borrower. Courts should permit
lenders to protect their interests in collateral and the borrower's creditworthiness. Such a presumption that the lender
exercised dominion should not be created where the lender
merely gives optional business advice. This presumption
would discourage lenders from fully discussing issues such as
extent of enrollment in federal farm programs, expected
trends in production, new farming techniques, the desirability
of various types of leases, and other business arrangements.
These discussions are mutually beneficial and provide an education for both lender and borrower. Only when a lender has
assumed a specific duty to provide competent advice should
public policy encourage farmers to sue if the advice was inappropriate. Borrowers should be encouraged to reasonably investigate and consider all of their borrowing alternatives.
Where a lender imposes requirements on a borrower and
the borrower becomes subservient, courts should ask whether
the requirements were reasonably necessary to protect the
lender's interest. A lender has a legitimate interest in conditioning credit on acceptance of covenants restricting certain
222. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
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actions that could negatively affect the borrower's
creditworthiness. Acceptable conditions include compliance
with a farm business plan, limitations on the ability to make
major expenditures, or, in some cases, downsizing of the farm
or ranch. Such loan covenants are commonly regarded as reasonably necessary to protect collateral.223
Courts should also remember that special circumstances sur-rounding certain types of farm loans require that the lender be
more involved in the borrower's finances. For example, agricultural lenders have special problems in monitoring certain
types of loans, such as those made for crop production. When
lenders make crop production loans in the spring, borrowers
often cannot pay off the loan until the crop is harvested in the
fall. In the interim, wind, hail, insects, drought, and disease
create significant risks. As a result, lenders must be allowed to
monitor the production loans. Since the collateral (i.e., the
crop) has little value until harvest, lenders often properly mitigate their risks by closely monitoring the farmers' operation
and by requiring approval of major expenses.2 24
Lenders, however, should not be allowed to exercise more
control than necesary to protect the collateral. Without established boundaries, a lender's conduct may cross the line and
extend into actual control of the day-to-day operations of the
farm. For example, a lender should not be allowed to impose
limitations on the borrower regarding who is permitted to
serve as management personnel for the farm. This decision
goes to the heart of farm business. Lenders can protect the
farm collateral and income stream in less intrusive ways. Likewise, lenders may not control day-to-day decisionmaking, including decisions concerning routine expenditures unless that
control is necessary to protect collateral.
Control over daily operation decisions is evidence of impermissible domination.225 For example, in A. GayJenson Farms Co.
223.

See RICHARD T. NASSBERG, THE LENDER'S HANDBOOK 16 (1986). See also Wag-

ner v. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) ("Normal supervision of
the enterprise by the lender for the protection of its security interest in loan collateral
is not 'active participation' "); Production Credit Ass'n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 547
(Wis. Ct. App. 1988) ("The loan provisions appellants rely on were to protect the
PCA's security interests and did not vest in the PCA control of appellant's
property.").
224. See Phillip L. Kunkel, The Fox Takes Over the Chicken House: Creditor Interference
with Farm Management, 60 N.D. L. REV. 445, 450-462 (1984).
225. See In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 337 (N.D. Ill. 1964), revd
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v. Cargill,Inc. ,226 the Minnesota Supreme Court found Cargill,
a major grain dealer, liable as a principal through an agency
relationship created as a result of Cargill's exercise of financial
227
and managerial control over a grain elevator operator.
Thus, lenders should use veto power over major expenditures.
Veto power is a more reasonable method and less intrusive of
the farmer's control of his or her business. 2
B.

Special Circumstances in the Farmer-Lender Relationship May
Result in Other Duties

Even when the relationship between a farmer and a lender
falls short of a fiduciary relationship, special circumstances
may result in other tort-based duties. The special circumstances that may create a duty between a farmer and a lender
include faith, trust, and confidence the farmer often reposes in
on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967); In re
American Lumber Co., 5 B.R. 470, 472-73 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
226. 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
227. Id. at 294. Factors indicating control included:
(1) Cargill's constant recommendations to Warren [the grain elevator operator] by telephone;
(2) Cargill's right of refusal on grain;
(3) Warren's inability to enter into mortgages, to purchase stock or to pay
dividends without Cargill's approval;
(4) Cargill's right of entry onto Warren's premises to carry on periodic
checks and audits;
(5) Cargill's correspondence and criticism regarding Warren's finances, officers salaries and inventory;
(6) Cargill's determination that Warren needed "strong paternal
guidance";
(7) Provision of drafts and forms to Warren upon which Cargill's name was
imprinted;
(8) Financing of all Warren's purchases of grain and operating expenses;
and
(9) Cargill's power to discontinue the financing of Warren's operation.
Id. at 291. The court noted that some of these factors are ordinarily found in a
debtor-creditor relationship, but the factors "must be viewed in light of all the circumstances surrounding Cargill's aggressive financing of Warren." Id.
228. Comment a to § 140 of the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY (1958) states:

A security holder who merely exercises a veto power over the business
acts of his debtor by preventing purchases or sales above specified amounts
does not thereby become a principal. However, if he takes over the management of the debtor's business either in person or through an agent, and
directs what contracts may or may not be made, he becomes a principal,
liable as any principal for the obligations incurred thereafter in the normal
course of business by the debtor who has now become his general agent.
The point at which the creditor becomes a principal is that at which he assumes de facto control over the conduct of his debtor, whatever the terms of
the formal contract with his debtor may be.
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the lender. 2 9 While reposing faith, trust in confidence alone is
not enough to create a fiduciary relationship, 230 it may be
enough to create the duty to avoid making negligent misrepresentations and the duty to give competent advice.
Many agricultural lenders do hold themselves out as specializing in agricultural lending and as experts in agricultural finance. When a borrower selects a lender or continues to deal
with a lender on the basis of the lender's stated expertise, it is
reasonable to hold the lender to the role of financial advisor.
Just as lawyers, accountants, and others have a duty to provide
sound advice to clients, agricultural lenders who render such
advice may have similar duties. 23 '
Farm borrowers should consider alleging violations of specific duties undertaken by the lender. Simply asserting a generalized claim of breach of fiduciary duty often requires proof
that the farm borrowers are unable to provide. Compounding
this problem are the difficulties farmers have establishing the
23 2
scope of the duties arising from the fiduciary relationship.
Instead, farm borrowers should consider asserting that the
unique relationship between farmers and lenders creates specific duties on the part of lenders to avoid giving negligent advice and making misleading statements.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Both courts and legislatures have been increasingly hostile
to lender liability actions. Much of this hostility results from
the well-founded desire to protect the sanctity of contract and
to add certainty to the debtor-creditor relationship. In some
cases, however, the relationship between the lender and borrower is broader than the typical debtor-creditor relationship.
Broad relationships may be more common between agricultural borrowers and lenders because of the very nature of the
agricultural community.
Where the lender assumes duties outside the four corners of
the typical debtor-creditor contract, courts should carefully an229. See
230. See
231. See
232. See
fine either
has arisen,

supra text accompanying notes 35-66.
supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
supra text accompanying notes 143-204.
Schaumann, supra note 110, at 22 ("[c]ourts are reluctant to precisely dethe circumstances under which a fiduciary relationship arises or, once it
the scope of the resulting duties").
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alyze the circumstances to ascertain whether breaches of those
duties are actionable. If, for example, a lender assumes the
role of trusted financial advisor, courts should examine
whether the bank's statements and advice were negligently
given. Though most courts have been hesitant to permit tort
remedies, courts should carefully examine the relationship of
the lender and borrowers. Because these relationships differ,
courts should avoid inappropriate categorical rules and examine the facts on a case-by-case basis before allowing recovery of tort damages.
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